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Abstract: In this paper we examine the signalling value for skills of different examination systems in 
relation to errors that may affect grades obtained by students. Firm use school grades as a signal of the 
effective skills of workers, taking into account that evaluation are effected by stochastic shocks. We show 
that more precise evaluation systems, being associated to a higher reactivity of wages to school grades, 
induce an higher level of student effort. However, the effect is heterogeneous: low ability students tend to 
react less compared to high ability students. Moreover, from our analysis, it emerges that individuals 
endowed with low abilities may prefer less accurate evaluation systems. Nevertheless, when productivity 
increases the convenience of these systems reduces and the number of individuals preferring them 
shrinks. Our analysis highlights an important trade-off between centralized and decentralized evaluation 
systems. Frequent evaluations, typical of decentralized systems, reduce the impact on grades of errors 
that influence student performance and in this way diminish signal noise, on the other hand, different 
teachers generally adopt different performance assessment standards, and this tends to produce noisier 
evaluations. Conversely, centralized systems use common evaluation standards, but their frequency is 
limited by relevant administration costs and then produce evaluations that are more affected by errors 
influencing student performance. In the final part of the paper we investigate the relationship between the 
optimal class size and evaluation systems. We show that under decentralized evaluation systems the class 
size also affects the signal noise, since larger classes may reduce the frequency of evaluations undertaken 
by teachers.  
 
JEL Classification: D02, H42, I28 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
External exit examinations and high standards are often advocated as the appropriate device for 
evaluating students in order to improve their skills and produce positive effects on the school 
system. A number of authors emphasize the positive consequences that centralised exams may 
produce on agents involved in the educational process.  
 First of all, since grades on centralised exams provide a better signal of students’ skills 
for employers compared to locally-graded examinations, wages tend to be higher where central 
exams are in place and students have greater incentives to learn (see Wößmann, 2005). 
Secondly, according to Bishop and Wößmann (2004), central exams provide parents with 
information on the performance of their children against an absolute standard and relative to 
other students in the educational system. This information allow parents to understand whether 
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it is the whole class which is performing badly or the low performance is limited to their own 
child, and in this way enables them to exert pressure both on students and teachers (Bishop 
1996; 1997; 2006). Thirdly, central exams also affect teachers’ behaviour since student 
performance on standardized tests can be used to monitor teaching quality on a regular basis and 
to offer output based incentives schemes (Lavy, 2004; Glewwe and Kremer 2006; Jürges, 
Richter, and Schneider 2004). Finally, with centralized examinations the achievement of 
students becomes crucial for school reputation and for attracting good students. 
 Empirical studies conducted by Bishop (1997) and (2006) indicate that central exit 
examinations significantly improve student performance1. Similarly, Wößmann (2005), using 
the international TIMSS micro data, estimates the effect of central exams suggesting that 
students who take a central exam at the end of upper secondary education outperform students 
in states without central exams. Jurges, Buchel and Schneider (2005) find analogous results 
considering the German educational system.  
 According to some recent studies, the positive effects of central exit examinations are 
heterogeneous and vary according to student abilities. Wößmann (2005) shows that the positive 
effect of central exams on student performance is higher for high ability students, while low 
ability students react less. Dee and Jacob (2006) find that exit exams increase student 
performance, but significantly reduce the probability of completing high school, particularly for 
black students, and increase the dropout rate in urban and high-poverty school districts. Similar 
results emerge by a study conducted by Dean and De Cicca (2001). 
 In spite of the favour encountered by centralized exams among economists they are 
strongly criticized among teachers and pedagogical specialists, who question their efficacy, 
since they undermine educational freedom and the pedagogical discretion that is supposed to be 
necessary to deal with heterogeneity among students. According to their view, external exams 
induce educators to teach to the test and to ignore important areas of knowledge. Teachers are 
able to evaluate, through direct observations, aspects of the students knowledge that are difficult 
to measure through standardized exams, which usually consist in a number of very specific 
questions. Lazear (2006) examines this issue concluding that standardized predictable test 
should be used when learning and monitoring are very costly, but should not be used with high 
ability students. The relative advantage of this type of test depends also on the degree of 
intrinsic motivation characterizing teachers: when the intrinsic motivation is low they perform 
better, while with highly motivated teachers less predictable exams are preferable.   
An important issue, which we analyse in this paper, is represented by the effect 
produced by different evaluation systems on measurement errors affecting students’ evaluations 
                                                     
1 See also Bishop and Mane (2001). 
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at exams and the use of these evaluations as a signal of effective skills. We consider two 
different types of errors: errors that influence student performance and errors deriving from 
different performance evaluation standards. According to the relevance of these errors, grades 
obtained by individuals during their educational career are a more o less reliable signal of their 
effective skills. In fact, we assume that firms are not able to observe neither individuals’ 
abilities nor the effort they provide in the educational process, but they simply observe the grade 
obtained by each student at the end of his educational career and try to infer student effective 
skills from it.  
Starting form these assumptions, we show that more precise evaluation systems are 
associated to a higher reactivity of wages to school grades and therefore induce a higher level of 
student effort. However, as shown in the appendix, if ability and effort are complements, the 
effect is heterogeneous among students, since the incentive effect of more accurate evaluation 
systems increases with students’ ability.  
From our analysis it emerges that individuals endowed with low abilities may prefer 
less accurate evaluation systems, since, due to the lack of effective signals of individual skills, 
they induce firms to pay a more egalitarian wage, based on average abilities and effort. 
Interestingly, the number of individuals preferring less precise evaluation systems reduces when 
productivity increases. In fact, these systems produce two effects: on the one hand, they lead to 
a more egalitarian pay structure, while, on the other hand, they reduce effort and, as a 
consequence, reduce the total output produced in the economy. When the productivity of skills 
is high the wage reduction deriving from the lower level of effort tends to counterbalance the 
positive effect that low ability agents obtain from the income redistribution. Then, the higher the 
productivity of skills the greater the support offered by society to evaluation systems that 
produce better signals for the labour market.  
 Using this framework, we compare advantages and disadvantages of centralized and 
decentralized evaluation systems. Decentralized evaluations carried out by teachers allow to 
evaluate students more frequently, since teachers and students interact on a daily basis,  
compared to centralized systems. Frequent evaluations reduce the impact of errors that influence 
student performance, such as being lucky enough to have studied the material relevant for the 
exam, or being in good health condition during the exam. However, different teachers may 
adopt different criteria and evaluation standards, introducing noise in student evaluation. On the 
other hand, centralized exams involve relevant costs and their frequency is limited, implying 
that evaluations emerging form them may be more affected by stochastic shocks affecting 
students’ performance, but at the same time, since they refer to a common standard, generate 
more reliable and comparable evaluations.  
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 Depending on the importance that these two type of errors play in distorting students’ 
performance at exams (the evaluation they obtain during their educational career) compared to 
their effective skills, it may result efficient to adopt a centralized evaluation system instead of a 
decentralized one. We show that grades on centralized exams provide a better signal that 
locally-graded exams of student’s competences to employers only when the variance of errors 
affecting student performance is lower compared to the variance of errors deriving from the 
adoption of different assessment methods.  
 In the final part of the paper we examine how evaluation systems affect the optimal 
class-size. In fact, even if evaluation carried out by teachers are generally considered costless, 
teachers may find it difficult to evaluate their students if their number is high. When class size 
increases, the cost to evaluate students increases for teachers and they may reduce the frequency 
of evaluations, making qualifications a more noisy signal of skills. In educational systems that 
rely on teachers’ evaluations, the policy maker deciding the class size has to take into account 
this effect. On the other hand, when the evaluation system is at centralized level, class size is 
decided only in relation to its effects on student achievement and to its costs. In fact, class size 
does not produce any effect on the information provided by qualifications relatively to students’ 
effective skills. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model showing how the 
signalling value of school grades is influenced by the accuracy of the evaluation systems and its 
effects on student effort and welfare. In section 3 we compare advantages and disadvantages 
respectively of centralized and decentralized evaluation systems. Section 4 is devoted to discuss 
the relationship between class size and evaluation systems. Section 5 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Measurement errors affecting student performance and the signalling 
value of evaluations  
We assume that individuals are risk-neutral and live for two periods: in the first period they go 
to school, sustaining the cost of effort, and in the second period they enter the labor market, 
obtaining a wage W. There is no discounting. Individuals are identical in every respect except 
their ability that is distributed according to a probability density function with mean a  and 
variance 2aσ . 
 Students attend school and attain an educational qualification with an evaluation of their 
skills made by schools. This evaluation is denoted by v which is affected by student effort e  
and ability a  and by two different types of errors: one related to factors that may influence the 
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student performance, indicated by ε , with mean zero and variance 2εσ , and the other, indicated 
by η, with mean zero and variance 2ησ , related to aspects concerning the teacher evaluation 
system. The first type of error depends on whether students were lucky enough to have studied 
the material precisely relevant for the exam, on how they felt that day, while the second is 
related to elements that affect teacher evaluation, for example the time he spends to correct the 
proof or whether he is more or less demanding. These errors are not correlated among them: it is 
plausible to think that stochastic variables affecting student behaviour are not be related with 
those affecting teachers’ evaluations. Moreover, we assume that errors are not correlated to 
individual ability or to his effort. Formally: 
( ) ( ) 0,),(),(),(),(, ====== ηεηεηεη CoveCovaCovaCoveCoveCov . 
 We assume the following specific functional form for the qualification obtained by 
individual i, iv
2: 
[1]     iiiii aev ηε +++=  
 The expected value of the qualification is equal to: aevE += ∗)(  and its variance is 
222)( ηε σσσ ++= avVar .  
 The lifetime individual utility function − recalling that individuals live for two periods 
and that there is no discounting − takes the following simple form: ( ) ( ) ( )ecWEUE ii −= . In 
order to avoid cumbersome analytical expressions, we use an explicit function to represent the 
cost of effort given by: ( ) 22eec γ= , where γ  is a parameter measuring the disutility of effort. 
This explicit function is common in the principal-agent literature (see, for example, Baker, 
Gibbons and Murphy, 1994; Prendergast, 1999).  
Labour market 
We assume that the output iy  produced by an individual in the labour market is related to his 
skills, deriving from his innate ability and on the effort provided during the period he was 
attending school. Therefore, we suppose that skills are equal to iii aes += . Output is then 
related to skills according to the following production function: 
[2]      ii sy π=  
where π  is a productivity parameter. 
                                                     
2 In the Appendix we experiment with a different functional form in which ability and effort interact in a 
complementary way. 
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With perfect information and perfectly competitive labour markets, the wage W 
obtained by the individual will be equal to his output: ( )iii aeW +=π .  
 However, we assume that firms are not able to observe neither individuals’ abilities 
neither the effort they provided in the educational process, but only observe the evaluation iv  
obtained by each student. Therefore, firms seek to infer the effective skills of workers on the 
basis of the evaluation iv . This is a typical “signal extraction” problem and firms estimate skills 
on the basis of the following formulation ( )ii vsE | . An important result in statistics is that if 
two variables are jointly normally distributed, ( )ii vsE  is a weighted sum of the unconditional 
mean ( )isE  and the signal iv . Formally we have that ( ) iii vvsE 10| ββ += , where the 
parameters 0β  and 1β  can be estimated using the standard OLS formulae. It follows that the 
two parameters 0β  and 1β  are given by the following expressions: 
[3]     ( )( )
( )
( )ηε
ηεβ +++
++++==
aeVar
aeaeCov
vVar
vsCov ,,
1   
[4]     ( ) ( )vEsE 10 ββ −=  
 
 Given our assumptions on variables’ variance and covariance, it is possible to show that 
( ) ( ) 2, aaVarvsCov σ== . Therefore: 
[5]     222
2
1
ηε σσσ
σβ ++= a
a  
[6]     ( )( )10 1 ββ −+= ∗ ae  
 
It follows that the wage paid by employers to each employee depends on the expected 
skills according to the following function: 
[7]     ( ) ( )iiiii vvaeEW 10| ββππ +=+=  
 
 This equation tells us how information on iv  updates firms expectation on individual 
skills and, then, how iv  affects wages.  
 
Student behaviour 
The expected utility of a student i  with ability ia  who provides a level of effort ei and obtains 
an evaluation iv  is equal to: 
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[8]   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]
22
2
10
2
10
i
ii
i
iiii
eeaevEecWEUE γββπγββπ −++=−+=−=  
 
Students decide the level of effort which maximizes their utility function, taking as 
given how the market rewards skills. By maximizing ( )iUE  with respect to effort, we obtain the 
following first order condition: 01 =− ieγπβ , from which the optimal level of effort is: 
[9]      γ
πβ1=∗e  
The level of effort provided by each student depends on the parameter representing 
productivity, the cost of effort, and on 1β , the reactivity of wages to skill evaluations. Since 
these factors are the same for all individuals, they provide an identical level of effort3.  
Substituting eq. [5] in eq. [9] we obtain: 
[10]      ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
++
=∗
222
2
ηε σσσ
σ
γ
π
a
ae  
The optimal level of effort increases when the variance of ε  and η  are lower (the 
evaluation system is less affected by stochastic variables) since employers, receiving a better 
signal of students’ abilities, are willing to pay a higher wage premium on grades attained at 
school. When evaluation is not affected by errors, that is ( ) 022 →+ ηε σσ , then 11 →β  and the 
optimal effort is equal to the first best level, γ
π=∗e . 
On the other hand, if measurement errors increase to infinity, that is 2εσ  or 2ησ   tend 
to ∞ , students’ effort decreases, because the evaluation is less informative on individual skills 
and firms pay a wage based on average abilities, aW π= . 
Moreover, if the variance of abilities is higher, then 1β  increases, positively affecting 
the effort provided by students. This because evaluation is more important when the variability 
of abilities is higher. In addition, when heterogeneity in individual abilities is  high the effect 
produced by shocks is less relevant and the signal provided by schools is more informative.  
 
                                                     
3 In the Appendix we show that when effort and ability are complements the effort provided by 
individuals depends on their ability. When the evaluation system becomes more precise, effort especially 
increases for high ability subjects. 
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The effects of the evaluation system accuracy on student welfare 
In this section we evaluate whether students’ welfare improves when the evaluation system 
adopted by the school system becomes more precise.  
Considering the optimal level of effort γ
πβ1* =e , the student’s expected utility given by 
eq. [8] can be written as: 
 
[11]     ( ) ( )γ
πβ
γ
πβββπ
2
2
11
10 −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++= ii aUE  
Substituting 0β  in [11] we obtain the following: 
 [12]     ( ) ( )γ
πβ
γ
πβπ
2
2
11
1 −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+= aaaUE ii  
 
We are now able to analyze the effect produced by an increase in the variance of error terms ε  
and η , respectively  2εσ  and 2ησ , on students’ utility. Let us denote the variance of errors ε  
and η  with 222 ηε σσσ += , deriving the individual expected utility with respect to 2σ  , we 
obtain:  
[13]    ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −∂
∂=∂
∂
2
1
1
2
12
1
2
2
1
2 2
1
2
11 σ
ββγ
πβσ
β
γ
ππσ
β
σ aa
UE
i  
which after some rearrangements becomes: 
 
[14]    ( ) ( ) ( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+−∂
∂=∂
∂
1
2
2
1
2 1 βγ
ππσ
β
σ aa
UE
i  
   
It is possible to show that [14] is negative, implying that individual utility reduces when 2σ  
increases, when:  
[15]    ( )11~ βγ
π −⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=> aaai                since 021 <∂
∂
σ
β . 
  
 It follows that students whose ability is above the threshold level a~  are negatively 
affected by less accurate evaluation systems, while students with abilities below this threshold 
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are positively affected. In fact, a wage system based on average skills, redistributing resources 
from high skilled individuals to low skilled ones, tends to favour the latter category.  
The threshold value a~  decreases when the disutility of effort becomes lower. More 
interestingly, this value decreases when productivity increases, implying that in highly 
productive economic systems also individuals with relatively low abilities prefer more accurate 
evaluation systems. Less accurate evaluation systems produce, in fact, two effects. On the one 
hand, they lead to a more egalitarian pay structure, while on the other hand, they reduce effort 
and, as a consequence, reduce the total output produced in the economy. When π  is high the 
wage reduction deriving from the lower level of effort tends to counterbalance the positive 
effect that low ability individuals obtain from the income redistribution deriving from a low 
value of 1β .  
 
3. A comparison between centralized and decentralized evaluation 
systems 
In this section we compare centralized and decentralized evaluation systems referring to the 
advantages deriving from repeated observations and costs due to heterogeneous assessment 
methods. While decentralized evaluations, carried out by teachers during their activity, often 
represents a by-product of teaching activity, deriving form the continuous interaction with 
students, centralized exams involve relevant costs and their frequency is limited.  
 During the educational process, teachers and students interact on daily basis and 
teachers have local knowledge regarding students’ psychological and physical conditions. Both 
these facts help at reducing the effect of stochastic shocks hitting students on the evaluation they 
obtain when the examination system is based on grades awarded at local level. On the other 
hand, teachers may follow different measurement criteria and this introduces noise in student 
evaluation making less convenient for employers to base their pay systems on observed 
educational performance. Conversely, central exams adopt a common standard and provide a 
better signal. However, they are undertaken less frequently and shocks affecting student 
performance may play a more relevant role in shaping examinations’ results. 
 To analyse this kind of trade-off we assume that with a centralized evaluation system 
students are evaluated according to a common standard and, as a consequence, the error term η  
deriving from heterogeneous evaluation methods is not relevant, implying that 02 =ησ . On the 
other hand, we assume that due to very high administration costs, this type of exam is 
undertaken only at the end of the educational process and shocks affecting students may 
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influence their performance at exams. It follows that the variance of evaluations awarded by the 
centralized system is equal to ( ) 22 εσσ += avVar .  
 When evaluation is at decentralized level, delegated to teachers, it is possible to 
evaluate student performance a large number of times, which we denote with n . Therefore, 
effects deriving from stochastic variables related to student performance are reduced, and the 
variance of this type of error is equal to 
n
2εσ . On the other hand, since different teachers adopt 
different evaluation methods the variance of evaluations is equal to: ( ) 222 ηε σσσ ++= nvVar a . 
It follows that the expected utility of individual i under a centralized examination system 
is equal to: 
[16]     ( ) ( )γπβγπβπ 2
2
1
1
C
i
CC
i aaaUE −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+=  
 Instead, under a decentralized evaluation system, the individual expected utility takes 
the following form: 
[17]     ( ) ( )γπβγπβπ 2
2
1
1
D
i
DD
i aaaUE −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+=  
 The centralized system produces a higher utility compared to the decentralized one 
when ( ) ( )DiCi UEUE > , which corresponds to the following: 
[18]  ( ) ( )γπβγπβπγπβγπβπ 22
2
1
1
2
1
1
D
i
D
C
i
C aaaaaa −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+>−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+  
 Simplifying some terms we obtain the following condition:  
[19]  ( ) ( ) 0
2 1111
>⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−− DCiDC aa ββγ
π
γ
πββ  
 
For individuals with average ability aai = , the previous equation becomes: 
[20]  ( ) 0
2
1 1111 >⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +−−
DC
DC ββ
γ
πββ  
Since 11 <Cβ  and 11 <Dβ , the term in square brackets is always positive. Therefore, a 
centralized evaluation system is preferred when DC 11 ββ > , that is when 22
2
εηε σσσ >+n  (the 
variance of the decentralized system is greater than the variance of centralized one) and gains 
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obtained by reducing the variance of ε  do not compensate the loss deriving form adding in the 
evaluation the variance of the error term η , typical of the decentralized system 
(
n
2
22 εεη
σσσ −> ).  
 It is interesting to notice that the difference  
n
2
2 εε
σσ −  increases when  2εσ    increases, 
implying that the advantage of decentralized systems is higher when shocks affecting student 
performance have a higher variance.  
 For individuals whose abilities are higher than the average ability, aai > , the same 
result holds. On the other hand, for low ability individuals the term in square brackets in 
expression [20] may be negative and in this case individuals may prefer evaluation systems with 
a higher variance.  
 
4. Class size and decentralized evaluation systems  
In the previous sections we assumed the number of evaluations undertaken in each evaluation 
system as exogenously given. However, the frequency of examinations is usually decided in 
relation to costs and benefits. In this section we show that under decentralized examination 
systems there is an important relationship among class size and the frequency of evaluations 
students are required to undertake.  
 Generally teachers’ evaluations are considered costless. Nevertheless if teachers face 
very large classes it may result difficult for them to judge students on the basis of daily 
interactions, participation to work-class, etc. When class size increases, the cost of evaluating 
students increases and teachers may decide to award grades to students on the basis of a lower 
number of evaluations. 
 In this section we consider a setting in which under a decentralized evaluation system a 
central authority is able to define class size, but it is not able to define the number of evaluations 
students have to undertake. This assumption is quite realistic since even when the authority is 
able to monitor the number of evaluations administrated by each teacher, he is still unable to 
ascertain their quality and accuracy. Then, we analyze the choice of the class-size by a policy 
maker who takes into account teachers’ behaviour. We model this choice as a sequential game 
in which, in the first stage, the policy-maker sets the class-size, while in the second stage, 
teachers decide how many evaluations to undertake.  
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 Let us assume a school system with  N students, C classes and C teachers, where 
C
NS =  
is the size of each class. Teachers maximize an objective function which depends positively on 
rewards that students obtain on the labour market and negatively from the cost of effort 
provided in teaching and evaluation activities that in our framework is represented by the 
number of evaluation undertaken for each student. When class size increases this cost increases, 
more precisely we assume that the evaluation cost suffered by each teacher teaching a class C of 
size S is equal to 2nS . Teachers decide the number of evaluations, taking as given the number 
of students they have in the class (class size).  
 They maximize the following utility function: 
 [21]    nS
nn
n
aU
a
aT −⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
+= γ
π
σσσ
σπ
ηε 222
2
 
where the first term represents the wage that the representative student with ability a  will 
receive on the labour market and the second term is the cost per student that the teacher suffers 
in relation to his evaluation activity. 
Deriving [21] with respect to n we obtain the following FOC: 
[22]   [ ] 02222
22
=−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++
=∂
∂ S
nnn
U
a
a
T
γ
π
σσσ
σσπ
ηε
ε  
 
From which we obtain the optimal number of evaluations: 
[23]   [ ]2221
22
12
1
2
22
η
εε
σσ
σγ
πσσ
+
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
a
a
S
S
n  
 
 From [23] it is possible to ascertain that n reduces when S increases. It is also interesting 
to notice that the effort teachers provide in their evaluation activity increases when the variance 
of shocks hitting students increases. In fact, since teachers take care of student welfare, they try 
to increase their effort in providing better evaluations when students’ performance is highly 
affected by factors behind their control.  
 On the other hand, when the signalling value of the qualifications awarded by schools is 
diminished by the fact that schools adopt highly differentiated evaluation methods, teachers’ 
incentives to provide effort in evaluating students is reduced. As a consequence, the positive 
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effect of adopting decentralized evaluation systems, highlighted in the previous section, may 
result undermined if the variance of shocks concerning teachers and schools is very high.  
 Since, as shown above, the number of evaluations administrated by teachers to their 
students is related to the number of students they face, the policy maker in setting the class-size 
has to consider the negative effect that a large class-size produces on the precision of the 
evaluation system. 
 We analyze the choice of the optimal class size when the policy-maker aims to 
maximize the wage obtained by students on the labour market net of school costs. These costs, 
denoted with D, are due to the wages paid to teachers and to the rental value of the capital 
associated to each classroom. The cost  per student is then given by 
S
D
N
DCCT == . The social 
welfare function, considering the wage obtained by the representative student with ability a  net 
of cost per student, is given by: 
[24]    
S
D
Sn
aV
a
a −
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
++
+= γ
π
σσσ
σπ
ηε 2
2
2
2
)(*
 
Substituting [23] in the social welfare function and making some rearrangements we obtain: 
[25]   
( ) S
D
S
aV
aa
a
a −
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+=
222
1
2
22
22
12
1
2
22
22
ηε
εε
σσγ
πσσ
σγ
πσσ
γ
σππ  
 
The optimal class size is obtained by deriving V with respect to S, which gives rise to the 
following First Order Condition (FOC): 
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  From [26] we obtain the optimal class size: 
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 It is easy to see that when the variance 2εσ  increases the optimal class size reduces. On 
the other hand, when 2ησ  increases it is optimal to define larger classes since the qualifications 
awarded by the school system are not a good signal of students abilities and as a result are 
scarcely rewarded on the labour market.  
 When the cost of education per student increases the optimal class size increases, while 
when the productivity of skills is higher it is optimal to reduce class size since this has a positive 
effect on the number of evaluations undertaken by students and hence on the precision of the 
evaluation system. 
 In this analysis, for the sake of simplicity, we have neglected the direct effect of class 
size on human capital accumulation process4. In a more general framework, considering this 
aspect, it is possible to show that in educational systems based on decentralized evaluations, the 
optimal class size is smaller compared to systems based on centralized evaluations. In fact, 
while in centralized evaluation systems the optimal class size only depends on the marginal 
benefit deriving from smaller classes in terms of student achievement and marginal costs related 
to higher expenditures for wages and rental capital, under decentralized evaluation systems class 
size also affects how informative evaluations are of individual skill. As shown in this section, 
larger classes may reduce the frequency of evaluations undertaken by teachers and worsen the 
informative value of evaluations. Instead, this effect does not play any role in the definition of 
optimal class size in centralized examination systems.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we analyze a labour market with imperfect observability of workers’ skills in 
which firms use grades (evaluations) obtained by students during the educational career in order 
to infer their productivity and, hence, determine their wages. Therefore, school grades are used 
by firms as a signal of abilities. We assume that firms form expectations on individual abilities 
solving a signal extraction problem. 
In this framework, we study the effects of different evaluation systems – characterized by 
different measurement errors – on the reliability of the signal and, therefore, on the relationship 
                                                     
4 See for example Lazear, 2001. 
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between wages and skills at individual level. We then analyze the effect that more precise 
evaluation systems produce on students effort in studying activities and on their welfare. We 
show that systems with lower measurement errors encourage students to provide a higher level 
of effort in studying activities. Employers, receiving a better signal of students’ skills, are 
willing to pay a higher wage premium on the grade attained at school and as a result students 
are induced to exert more effort.  
However, whereas high ability individuals strictly prefer more precise evaluation 
systems, low ability individuals may prefer less precise evaluations. We show that when labor 
productivity increases also individuals with relatively low abilities prefer more accurate school 
performance evaluation systems. This because less accurate evaluation systems on the one hand 
lead to a more egalitarian pay structure, improving welfare obtained by less able subject, but on 
the other hand, they reduce effort and, as a consequence, reduce the total output produced in the 
economy. When labour productivity is high, the wage reduction deriving from the lower level of 
effort tends to over compensate the positive effect that low ability individuals obtain from more 
egalitarian pay systems.  
 Stimulated by a growing theoretical and empirical literature which considers centralized 
examinations as an instrument to improve students performance and educational quality (Bishop 
and Wößmann, 2004; Wößmann, 2005 among others) we then use our framework to compare 
costs and benefits of centralized vs. decentralized evaluations. From the perspective followed in 
this paper, the advantage of a decentralized system is that it allows repeated evaluations of 
students performance and, hence, it is able to reduce measurement errors due to shocks hitting 
students. On the other hand, a centralized system, referring to a common standard, avoids errors 
deriving from different assessment standards that usually characterized locally graded exams. 
We show that the advantage of decentralized systems is higher when shocks affecting student 
performance have a higher variance.  
In the final part of the paper we study the relationship between the number of 
evaluations and the class size under a decentralized system, showing that teachers (or schools), 
who care of students’ welfare, reduce the number of evaluations when class size is higher but 
tend to increase evaluations if shocks hitting students are more important. A policy maker 
deciding class size reduces it when individual measurement errors are higher, whereas increases 
class size if teacher evaluations errors are the main source of errors. 
 
 
Appendix A 
A more general skill function assuming complementariety relationship between ability and 
effort 
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The aim of this appendix is to provide a framework in which effort and abilities are 
complementary with the aim to show that students with different abilities react different to an 
increase in the precision of the evaluation system. We assume a complementariety relationship 
between effort and abilities in defining individual skills. More precisely, we assume that skills 
acquired by students during their permanence at school are equal to aes =  . 
Firms set wages inferring the real skills of workers on the basis of the evaluation they 
obtain at school. As a consequence, firms pay a wage ( ) ( )vvaeEW 10| ββππ +=+= . Given the 
skill acquisition function, 1β  and 0β  are given by the following: 
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 Taking into account the wage firms are willing to pay for the qualification iv , the student 
expected utility is given by: 
[1A] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
2
ˆˆ1
2
2
11
2
10
i
ii
i
ii
eeaaeevEUE γββπγββπ −+−=−+=  
Maximizing with respect to effort, we obtain the following first order condition: 
[2A]  ( ) [ ] 01ˆ =−=∂∂ iii eaeUE γβπ  
Let [3A] denote an implicit function based on the previous FOC 
[3A]  ( ) ( ) 01ˆ =−=∂
∂= iii eaee
UEF γβπ  
We use the implicit-function theorem to analyse the effect produced by an increase in the 
variance of ε,a  and η  on the student effort. We obtain: 
[4A]  
eF
a
eF
Fe j
i
j
j ∂∂−
∂
∂
=∂∂−
∂∂=∂
∂ σ
βπσ
σ
1
   where ηε ,,aj =  
  
Since the denominator is always positive when SOC is respected, form [4A] it emerges that 
student effort reduces when εσ  and ησ  increase. This result is in line with that discussed in 
section 3. However, form [4A], it is possible to see that more accurate evaluation systems exert 
heterogeneous effects on students’ performance. For low ability students the incentive effect of 
more precise evaluation systems is relatively small. In fact, the effects of accurate evaluation 
systems increase with students’ ability.  
  
 
17
 This result finds support in some empirical analysis showing that the effect of central 
examination on student performance are lower for low ability students relative to high-ability 
students (Wößmann, 2005) 
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